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Abstract
The conventional academic rationale for supranational intervention to curb
state aids to industry appeals to transfrontier spillovers. However, competition
policy practitioners often speak in terms of curbing ”wasteful” spending, re-
gardless of whether or not any international spillovers are involved. Although it
is often argued that such wasteful spending calls not for supranational state aid
control but rather for better domestic political accountability, this paper argues
that wasteful spending may be a by-product of accountability, not a symptom of
its absence. Specifically, we describe a model in which politicians fund projects
that are wasteful as a way to signal their diligence, and voters rationally re-
ward them for this. We discuss implications for the role of state aid control
mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
State aid control is a paradox: in the name of protecting competition, a public
authority intervenes in spending decisions taken by other public authorities—
-rather than in decisions taken by private firms, as in the rest of the domain of
competition policy. What is the rationale for such intervention? The conven-
tional answer to this question points to international spillovers: when markets
are both international and imperfectly competitive, spending by a public au-
thority in one country can subsidize its own economic activity at the expense of
lost activity in another country. Therefore, the story goes, supranational inter-
vention - by the European Commission or the WTO, as appropriate - may be
needed to ensure that countries do not engage in a collectively wasteful "subsidy
war". The problem arises because public authorities make spending decisions
on the basis of narrowly national (or regional) interests, and the solution re-
quires intervention by other public authorities that are capable of taking a more
collective point of view.
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Although there is much to be said for this rationale, it captures rather poorly
what competition policy practitioners (both competition agencies and the polit-
ical authorities to which they are responsible) say when explaining their actions.
Explanations are often couched in terms of curbing "wasteful" spending, regard-
less of whether or not any international spillovers are involved. The State Aid
Action Plan launched in June 2005 by the European Commission, for example,
talks of the need to aim for "less but better targeted" state aid. However, even if
much state aid is indeed wasteful, in the absence of international spillovers it is
hard to see why supranational intervention should be justified. Is not the waste
of fiscal resources involved simply a matter of domestic political failure to be
resolved by strengthening the mechanisms of domestic political accountability?
In this paper we argue that wasteful spending by politicians can sometimes
arise as a by-product of mechanisms of political accountability, so that sim-
ply strengthening these same mechanisms would not necessarily improve–and
might even worsen–the quality of spending decisions. The idea is that politi-
cians sometimes engage in wasteful spending not out of negligence but rather
out of a desire to improve their chances of re-election by signaling their com-
mitment to supplying public goods. Funding projects, even wasteful ones, is
a conspicuous way to signal this. We develop a model that shows (a) how this
may be rational on the part of politicians, and (b) how the increased probabil-
ity of re-election that follows from the wasteful spending decisions nevertheless
reflects rational behavior on the part of voters, too. Voters reward conspicuous
spending because it is evidence of effort on the part of politicians–even though
it is associated, on average, with some degree of waste.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we survey briefly the literature
on the economic effects of state aids and the rationale for state aid control.
Section 3 summarizes some evidence for the view that politicians often provide
excessive subsidies to investment projects that create some public benefits (such
as employment in depressed regions). Section 4 develops our model, and Section
5 discusses how to think of state aid control in the context of this model. Section
6 concludes.
2 The rationale for state aid control
The academic literature on interjurisdictional externalities identifies many rea-
sons why government action to support economic activity in their own state
will impinge on other states (see Besley & Seabright 1999). Most relevant to
state aid control is the literature on ”strategic trade policy” (e.g. Brander and
Spencer 1985), in which countries compete with each other in a game of indi-
vidually rational but collectively wasteful subsidies to industry, spurred by the
prospect of poaching each other’s profits in imperfectly competitive markets.
All countries are therefore better off if they can reach and enforce an agreement
to forgo such subsidies. In these models, it makes no difference where firms
choose to undertake their economic activity, so there is no purpose in govern-
ments competing to attract economic activity and there are no benefits from
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such competition to offset the possible costs. Instead inter-government activity
is purely a form of rent shifting. Interpreted in the context of state aids, this
means that subsidies to firms will consequently be higher than would be efficient
and that the level of subsidized activity will higher than is efficient.1
Matters are very different in models in which mobility of firms between
jurisdictions can have efficiency-enhancing properties. In a world without exter-
nalities and many jurisdictions, Tiebout (1956) proposed the notion that inter-
governmental competition resulted in a virtuous sorting function. The Tiebout
literature therefore emphasizes the benefits of decentralization in inducing ju-
risdictions to compete for sources of tax revenue by inducing citizens and firms
to sort themselves into groups on the basis of their preferences for local public
goods. Althoàugh Tiebout wrote about citizens, others (e.g. Oates & Schwab
1991) have developed the analysis for firms.2
The new economic geography has provided another basis for thinking that
there are externalities in the location of economic activity (see Neary 2001). In
these models the location and production decisions of firms may have important
external effects (congestion, job creation...) on their host economies, so that
government action to internalize these externalities (by taxes, subsidies, or other
means) is in principle justified even though the public policy conclusions are at
best mixed. Regional or national governments can internalize some externalities
through their actions, but others (notably those that spill across borders) will
remain, and the results of inter-jurisdictional competition might be better or
worse than prior to the intervention.
Overall, the most general conclusion that can be drawn from this literature
is that, while the gains from intervention by regional or national governments
to support private firms may be large or small according to circumstances, the
only grounds for preventing such intervention (by state aid control at a suprana-
tional level) rest on the presence of a transfrontier externality that the normal
processes of bargaining between governments and firms fail to internalize. The
presumption, however, is that governments are acting to maximize the welfare
of their own jurisdictions–or at least that, if they are not, then this is a do-
mestic political failure that is at most indirectly related to the international
competition between governments to attract firms. If such a presumption is not
justified in practice, then the normative conclusions of this literature may not
be justified either.
1This conclusion will be altered if there are independent reasons for thinking that subsidies
in the absence of the externality would have been below the efficient level–e.g., because the
activity in question was an international monopoly whose potential entrants did not take
account of the beneficial externality their entry would create for consumers.
2Oates (1969) expounded the benefits of multijurisdictional policy making for somewhat
different reasons. Decentralization allows different kinds and levels of public goods to be
supplied in different localities, in a way assumed to be difficult for centralized governments to
implement.
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3 Wasteful spending: the evidence
The evidence that governments often subsidize private firms in ways that do
not maximize the welfare of their own jurisdictions comes from a variety of
sources. Some of it is frankly anecdotal: expensive prestige projects such as
Concorde, or the well-publicized state support to struggling firms such as Crédit
Lyonnais, Alsthom, and MGRover. Although strongly suggestive, such evidence
is hard to evaluate. Does it represent more than the errors of judgment that
frequently occur when industrial decisions are made, in the private and public
sectors (as attested by private sector disasters like Vivendi Universal, Enron,
and WorldCom)? Two more systematic kinds of evidence strengthen the case.
First, there is econometric evidence that politicians and public officials tend to
favor projects in relatively high-technology sectors, whether or not these are
suitable for the comparative advantage of the location in question. A study by
Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) showed that both national state aids
and EU regional aid often failed to attract targeted industries to a significant
degree because they did not take comparative advantage into account (e.g,.
whether there was enough skilled labor in the workforce). Citizens therefore
often failed to benefit from agglomeration economies. A second bias is that
politicians frequently ignore the impact of one project on others. A study by
Algan et al. (2002) showed that such impacts can be large: public employment
can reduce private employment through general equilibrium effects. The last
biennial report of the German Monopolkommission (2003) also discusses these
harmful interproject effects at some length. And the study by Midelfart-Knarvik
and Overman just cited suggests one route by which this could occur: subsidized
projects could bid up the price of a scarce resource like skilled labor, making it
less available for other firms.
The second kind of systematic evidence comes from recent studies showing
the importance in industrial productivity growth of entry and exit of firms,
precisely the processes that government subsidies to private firms tend to slow
down–since these subsidies generally go to established firms rather than new
entrants, and are hard to curtail if the projects fail. For instance, Hobijn and
Jovanovic (2001) have shown not only that the US stock market recovery of
the 1980s and 1990s was driven almost entirely by new firms, but also that
incumbent firms of the early 1970s that did not take over or merge with new
firms had still not recovered their market value relative to US GDP even by
the end of the 1990s. Disney et.al. (2003) showed that half the growth of labor
productivity in U.K. manufacturing 1980—92 was due not to internal growth of
plants but instead to selection (the replacement of low-productivity plants by
high-productivity plants). Moreover, 80-90% of total factor productivity growth
was attributable to selection.3
Overall, it seems highly plausible that political processes driven by the desire
for politicians to gain favorable press coverage may lead to spending decisions
that incur costs that are out of proportion to the resulting economic benefits.
3See also Aghion and Howitt (2005) on the positive effect of exit of firms on economic
growth.
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A recent case approved by the European Commission provides an interesting
illustration.4 The Portuguese government approved aid worth C=41,5 million (at
2000 prices) to the semiconductor firm Infineon in order to establish a plant
manufacturing DRAM memory chips in Portugal. According to the firm’s own
estimates (plausibly erring on the optimistic side) the investment will generate
252 new jobs and safeguard 596 existing ones–a total of 848 at a cost of some
C=49,000 per job. Yet a study by Haskel et al. (2002) estimates that foreign
direct investment generates productivity spillovers worth around C=3,500 per
job per year, so the project would have to continue for 25 years just to pay for
itself–even discounting the possibility that Infineon’s spillovers are lower than
estimated (since there are no other DRAM manufacturers in Portugal). Does
it really seem likely that Portugal’s politicians are getting value for money? If
not, then what is prompting them to spend money in this way?
In the next section we provide a simple model, drawn from Dewatripont &
Seabright (2005), that may help answer this question.5
4 A model of conspicuous spending
There is a project (think of it as a subsidy to attract a foreign firm) that has a
cost c and generates a value v ∈ {v, v}, which is observed by the politician and is
not observed by the voters. Voters are risk neutral and care about v− c (where
c can be considered as including the shadow cost of public funds). Hence, in
the first-best outcome, the project should go ahead if and only if v ≥ c; and to
make the problem interesting, we assume that v > c > v.
However, the decision on the project’s future is made by a politician, whose
interests are not the same as those of the voters. We represent the politician’s
choice by a ∈ {0, 1}, with a = 1 meaning that the project is funded. Politi-
cians care less about the benefits generated by the projects than voters do–for
example, because politicians could alternatively use the money in ways that fur-
thered their own interests more directly. There is, however, uncertainty about
how much they do care, and this raises the possibility of adverse selection.
Specifically, assume that the politician cares about αv, where α ∈ {α, α}, with
probability p that α = α and probability (1− p) that α = α, and 0 < α < α < 1.
Only the politician knows α. In principle the α-type is the ”better” politician
from the point of view of the voters, though we shall show that this involves a
subtle trade-off between moral hazard and adverse selection considerations.
Moral hazard arises because the politician must invest (at a cost) to find a
good project. Let the probability that the politician finds a project with v = v
be i ∈ (0, 1), where i is her investment level. Investment i costs her ψ (i), which
4See the Commission decision at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:120:0005:0020:FR:PDF
5See Robinson and Torvik (2005) for a different model of equilibrium inefficient public
projects where the inefficiency of the project is precisely what makes it attractive for politi-
cians. Indeed, because the project is inefficient, it might be discontinued were the incumbent
politician replaced by an opponent; this, in turn, prompts the voters who benefit from the
project to vote for the incumbent politician.
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is increasing and convex in i. Assume also that all politicians care about re-
election, which yields them a rent B. This kind of ”career concerns” model of
political motivation is standard in the literature (see Persson & Tabellini 2000,
Besley 2006).
Without allowing for the possibility of state aid control, which we discuss
later, the timing of the model is as follows: At stage 0, Nature chooses α; at
stage 1, the politician chooses i and then learns v; at stage 2, the politician
decides whether to fund the project or not (i.e., chooses a); finally, at stage 3,
the voters decide whether or not to re-elect the politician.
Since the project generates returns too late to be verified in advance of the
election, the re-election decision is made simply according to whether or not the
project is funded. We assume for now that (a) if the project is funded then the
politician is re-elected with a probability r, and (b) if it is not funded then she
is not re-elected (more on this shortly). So the politician’s problem is as follows:
Max
i
{i (αv +Br − c) + (1− i)max [αv +Br − c, 0]− ψ (i)} . (1)
To make effort worthwhile, this program incorporates the assumption that
if v = v then the politician gains more from funding the project than from not
funding it, which would yield her a payoff of 0 (no benefit, no cost, and no re-
election). As for the case where v = v, we make the following explicit assumption
in order to investigate the possibility that politicians may ”overbid” for projects:
αv +Br ≥ c > αv +Br. (2)
This implies that a ”bad” politician (one of type α) takes actions that are
ex post efficient whereas a ”good” politician (one of type α) overfunds due
to re-election concerns, since she funds the low-value project and not just the
high-value project. Nevertheless, voters may still rationally prefer to re-elect
the type-α politician even in the knowledge that she will overfund. The reason
is that she will exert more effort than the bad politician, and the value of this
effort may outweigh the efficiency cost of overfunding. Indeed, given condition
(2), we can rewrite (1) for the good politician as
Max
i
{i (αv +Br − c) + (1− i) (αv +Br − c)− ψ (i)} (3)
which yields the first-order condition for effort α (v − v) = ψ0 (i). As for the
bad politician, we can re-write 1 as:
Max
i
{i (αv +Br − c)− ψ (i)} (4)
which yields the first-order condition for effort αv+Br−c = ψ0 (i). Denoting by
i and i the utility-maximizing choices of effort for the good and bad politician
(respectively), it is straightforward to show that i > i.6
6To see this, note that α (v − v) > α (v − v) = (αv +Br − c) − (αv +Br − c) >
(αv +Br − c), where the last inequality follows from assumption (2).
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Since voters do not internalize the effort cost of the politician, they strictly
prefer more effort to less. This will outweigh the less efficient funding choices
of the good politician–and thus lead voters to reward a politician who reveals
herself to be good with greater probability–if and only if:
iv +
¡
1− i
¢
v − c > i (v − c) (5)
where the left-hand (resp. right-hand) side represents the voter’s gain with
the α-type (resp. α-type) of politician. This condition will hold if and only if
the expected gain from the higher probability of a good project outweighs the
expected loss from overfunding by an over-zealous politician–that is,if and only
if: ¡
i− i
¢
(v − c) >
¡
1− i
¢
(c− v) . (6)
This is more likely to hold when: (i) i is high, so good politicians are rela-
tively likely to find good projects; (ii) i is low, so bad politicians are relatively
likely to find bad projects; (iii) v − c is high, so good projects are of relatively
high value; and (iv) c− v is low, so bad projects are not too costly.
Our model is thus one in which politicians, owing to career concerns, under-
take effort to attract foreign firms and thereby generate employment in their
area. Voters are rightly impressed when these efforts are successful, leading
them to revise upward their belief about the politican’s quality, even though
they understand that the process involves funding of some inefficient projects.
Clearly, our model is not the first one to look at the effect of career concerns
on politicians’ behavior. See in particular Persson and Tabellini (2000) and
Rogoff and Siebert (1988) for discussions of the disciplining effects of career
concerns on politicians. They have also stressed (albeit in different contexts
than in our model) the potential negative effects of career concerns; Tthese can
exacerbate a politician’s incentive to raise distortive taxes in order to finance
public goods that improve her standing in the eyes of voters.
5 State aid control
A natural way to view state aid control–investigated in Dewatripont and Seabright
(2005)–is as an extra hurdle that publicly funded projects must clear in order to
be finally approved. Modeling this requires specifying explicitly the incentives
of the controlling agent (say, a European commissioner or DG-Competition)
that makes the decision. For example, one can have this agent undertake effort
to obtain verifiable information that would justify blocking the project, with
the probability of finding this evidence being higher for a bad project but being
still positive for a good project. Controllers can (like politicians) have career
concerns and be rewarded for blocking projects, which is rational for voters to
endorse because it increases beneficial effort even if it leads to decisions that are
sometimes too strict. In such a setting, voters may be better off with a control
regime that sometimes blocks good projects, provided: (i) it blocks bad projects
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sufficiently more often; (ii) bad projects are sufficiently costly: and (iii) there
are enough bad projects relative to good projects.
Note that, provided the conditions for overbidding by good politicians hold,
the voters are more likely to benefit from state aid control if there is a high
proportion of good politicians selecting projects for funding! And although this
is not modeled explicitly, it seems likely that the proportion of bad projects
may be raised by international competition between governments that bid for
investment projects by multinational firms, because such competition raises the
share of the rent from any such projects that will be captured by the firms and
lowers the share going to the bidding governments. Such increased competition
doubtless accounts for the fact that the perceived need for state aid control has
increased as international competition to attract foreign direct investment has
intensified in recent years.
We can also note that this model captures one feature of the state aid control
process that matches anecdotal descriptions by participants and enforcers in the
European Union–namely that national politicians often welcome the pressure
placed on them by the European Commission not to fund wasteful projects
(while not wishing the fact that they welcome this pressure to be known in their
own countries). This otherwise puzzling behavior has a natural explanation in
the model: a politician funds wasteful projects not because she intrinsically
wants them but rather because she want to send a signal about being a good
type of politician. Of course, politicians want to send this signal regardless
of which type they actually are, but it is more often incentive-compatible for
the good types than the bad types to send it. However, if they can find some
other way to send this signal then they will welcome the cancellation of the
projects, whose costs are (by assumption) higher than the value that either type
of politician places on their intrinsic benefits. Therefore, to the extent that a
state aid control mechanism can signal to domestic voters that the politicians
backing them are of the good type, the project cancellation will be a welcome
outcome of the mechanism. Naturally, this cannot be expected to occur with
certainty, for otherwise funding decisions by politicians would become purely
cheap talk and would lose their signaling value.
Finally, is there anything intrinsically international about state aid con-
trol? Could not some domestic mechanism (an auditor-general or a ”Cour des
Comptes”) act as controller? The answer is certainly that it could–provided
it were sufficiently independent (and visibly so) of domestic political processes
to provide the necessary check on domestic funding decisions. However, if there
already exists an agency (e.g.,the European Commission) that has the exper-
tise necessary to examine state aids for the presence of international spillovers,
then it is plausible that such an agency would be able, at relatively low cost,
to provide the credible countervailing incentives that a controller would require.
It thus makes sense for the two rather different functions to be exercised by
the same statutory body, even if one of the functions is to counter the strictly
domestic failures of the political process.
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6 Conclusion
There is substantial evidence suggesting that politicians often engage in wasteful
spending on projects — projects, in other words, that generate real benefits to
their host economies but at a disproportionate investment cost. The conclusion
is often drawn that this phenomenon requires a strengthening of the mechanisms
of domestic political accountability and has nothing to do with supranational
state aid control. In this paper we argue that wasteful spending may be a by-
product of these mechanisms of accountability rather than a symptom of their
absence. In such circumstances, simply strengthening accountability mecha-
nisms would not solve the problem. State aid control should then be conceived
as a necessary complement to such domestic accountability mechanisms; the
state aid control mechanism need not be supranational, but it will often make
sense for it to be so.
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